



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

creator of laws and values is the will; wherefore the will to believe should be, in modern philosophy, the will to control.

Marchesini sees that individualism is wrapped up in pragmatism, and accepts the individualistic point of view as the presupposition of his doctrine. As there is no absolute truth for the intellect, so there is no absolute moral ideal. Morality is always personal and individual, and can not claim to be effectively anything else.

The individualistic nature of morality is grounded for Marchesini in the reciprocal transcendency of real things. An ethical ideal that is independent of my own nature is transcendent with respect to my concrete individuality. It is one of those fictions of the mind to the study of which Marchesini's book is evidently devoted. Marchesini is not discouraged, however, at the discovery that an objective ideal is a mental fiction. This discovery is in fact a saving experience; for if we take what is a symbol, and make of it a reality, and set it up as end and object of our activity, the aspiration toward it can lead only to discouragement or to ecstasy or to contemplative mysticism. The construction of fictions is an act that is manifest in all the regions of mental life, and the ethical fiction of an absolute ideal functions as a guide and a check to conduct, and controls it in the interest of social organization. The maxim which Marchesini reaches is as follows: 'Act as if what is true socially and is socially imposed as absolute, were true and absolute also for you,'—or in other words, 'act as if you were not you.'

In his criticism of this doctrine, Signor Calò has overlooked one rather obvious point of attack. If Marchesini bases his whole theory on the positivistic assumption that real things are reciprocally independent and transcendent, and then deduces from this fact the conclusion that the idea of such reciprocal independence is a mental fiction, the critic need not take the conclusion very seriously. One has very strongly the impression, however, that Marchesini has written a decidedly interesting book.

WENDELL T. BUSH.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

ARCHIV FÜR SYSTEMATISCHE PHILOSOPHIE. Band XI, Heft 2, May, 1905. *Vorbemerkungen zu einer 'allgemeinen Entwicklungsgeschichte'* (pp. 125-169): B. WEISS. — For the purpose of peace and justice in society there is needed an encyclopedia of science from the evolutionary point of view, to the rejection of anthropocentrism, of materialism and of idealism. Evolution in individuals implies essentially aggregation, with three stages: of differentiation, integration and torpidity. Race evolution is continuous from atom to man. Evolutionary history has six large with several subordinate divisions. *Künstlerische Regelmässigkeit* (pp. 170-177): K. WORM. — The laws of art impose themselves on the genius; he imposes rules on artists. *Zur Methodologie der Wirtschaftswissenschaft* (pp. 178-190): F. LIFSCHITZ. — The work of eco-

nomic science is simply to explain the evolutionary tendencies of economic life; it is not normative. The distinctions between theoretical, empirical and practical economics are not valid, just because all are concerned simply with the relation of cause and effect. *La philosophie en France* (pp. 191-196): C. Bos.—Reviews of Allier's 'La philosophie d'Ernest Renan,' Roberty's 'Frederic Nietzsche' and Tardieu's 'L'ennui.' *La dualita oggettiva universale come riflesso della forma dualistica dell'appercezione mediata* (pp. 197-218): G. D. VALLE. The cognitive function is essentially a mediating function. The distinction between subject and object is set up in and by the cognitive process, and it is vain to try to overcome it. The frequent antithetical pairs, extension and spirit, mass and movement, matter and force, quantity and quality, etc., are echoes of this fundamental cognitive distinction. *Bericht über die deutsche ästhetische Literatur aus den Jahren 1900-1905* (pp. 221-244): A. TUMARKIN.—Reviews of Lipps's 'Ästhetik,' and Dahmen's 'Die Theorie des Schönen.' *Die neuesten Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiete der systematischen Philosophie. Zeitschriften. Eingegange Bücher.*

ANNALEN DER NATURPHILOSOPHIE. Band IV., Heft 3, July, 1905. *Ueber die Arbeit als Rechtsboden* (pp. 281-300): K. W. JURISCH.—Germany is still chained by the old Roman law for which only the corporeal or tangible is a thing, wherefrom result many absurdities and a barren schematism. Every product of human work should stand under the law's explicit protection, a reform in which university theorists should lead. Work is defined, in every sphere, as the overcoming of obstacles. *Das duale System der Harmonie* (pp. 301-338): A. V. OETTINGEN.—A continued exposition of the tonic and phonic elements of harmony, being sections IV., V. and VI. *Kant's Lehre von der Kausalität* (pp. 339-385): O. BUTSCH.—By the 'identity of the mind's action' as the essential source of unity and regularity in apprehension, and of the existence of nature, Kant must have meant simply our 'constant sense of thinking.' Causal necessity is due merely to the absence of contrary experience. Solipsism would follow from the incapacity of the mind really to be affected by objects outside it. Kant's comparison of the perception of the house, and of a boat on a stream asserts objective causality, contradicting his fundamental position. Other contradictions cited and analyzed. For the apriority of causality Kant advanced no scientific proof. *Vorbemerkungen zu einer Neugrundlegung der Wirtschaftswissenschaft* (pp. 386-403): J. ZMAVC.—The demand for an economic based on the concept of work rather than of supply and demand is supported by the facts of the limited resources of the earth and by the unprecedented severance of classes. *Neue Bücher* (pp. 403-416): Reviews by 'W. O.' of the following, among others: C. Siegel, *Zur Psychologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*. H. Sewarz, *Der moderne Materialismus als Weltanschauung und Geschichtsprinzip*. K. Heim, *Das Weltbil der Zukunft*. R. Semon, *Die Mneme als erhaltende Prinzip im Wechsel des Organischen Geschehens*. H. Swoboda, *Studien zur Grundlegung der Psychologie*.

KANTSTUDIEN. Band XI., Heft 3 u. 4. *Luther und Kant* (pp. 351-492): BRUNO BAUCH. - A detailed comparison in large measure contesting Harnack's opinion in the matter, and concluding that 'In Kant Luther's moral-religious sentiment attains the standpoint of reason.' It treats of Luther's opinion as to the relation of faith and reason, his idea of the supreme good, and his conception of God. *Anfänge des Kritizismus. Methodologisches aus Kant* (pp. 493-517): A. RIEHL. - The rise of criticism, incomparably the most significant event in modern philosophy, has three stages: analysis of concepts with examination of their genesis; probing of the concept of experience with skeptical results; the proof that while experience is knowledge, knowledge is limited to experience. The critique is not psychological but objective. *Reden zur Feier der Wiederkehr von Kant's 100 Todestage* (pp. 518-534): H. RENNER. - A summary of the several German panegyrics called forth by the anniversary. *Zwei dänische Festgaben zum Kantjubiläum*: A. AALL. *Zur Blattversetzung in Kants Prolegomena*: SITZLER. *Nachwort*: H. VAHINGER. *Recensionen* (pp. 545-557): including, B. Christiansen, *Erkenntnistheorie und Psychologie des Erkennens*: F. MEDICUS. A. Riehl, *Zur Einführung in die Philosophie der Gegenwart*: J. W. A. HICKSON. E. Katzer, *Das Problem der Lehrfreiheit und seine Lösung nach Kant*: SULZE. *Selbstanzeigen* (pp. 558-565). *Mittelungen*.

Boadrero. *Il principio fondamentale del sistema di Empedocle*. Rome: Loescher. 1905.

Ellis, Havelock. *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*. Philadelphia: F. A. Davis Co. 1905. xii + 270 pp. \$2.00.

Hyslop, James Hervey. *Problems of Philosophy; or Principles of Epistemology and Metaphysics*. 8vo. Pp. 14 + 647. \$5.

NOTES AND NEWS

FROM *Nature* we take the following: "In the *Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society* for June, Dr. Edw. Kasner directs attention to a significant dialogue in Galileo's 'Discorsi e dimostrazioni matematiche' of 1638, in which modern concepts of infinity as laid down by Bolzano, Cantor and Dedekind appear to have been foreseen by that philosopher. In this dialogue Salviati points out to Simplicio that since every number has a square, there must be as many squares as there are numbers, but, on the other hand, since there are many numbers which are not squares, there must be more numbers than squares. In answer to Simplicio's question, 'What is to be our conclusion?' Salviati gives the following remarkable reply: 'I see no escape except to say, the totality of numbers is infinite, the totality of squares is infinite, the totality of roots is infinite; the multitude of squares is not less than the multitude of numbers, neither is the one greater than the other; and finally, the attributes of equal, greater and less, are not applicable to infinite, but solely to finite quantities.'"